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HOW TO BE A TERRORIST WITHOUT 
REALLY TRYING: A COMMON LAW TEST 
FOR DETERMINING WHO IS “PART OF” A 
TERRORIST GROUP 
Andrew Kessel* 
Abstract: This Comment critiques the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’s 
practice of utilizing a case-by-case approach to determining whether an 
individual detained at the military facilities of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is 
considered “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda. The 2010 case of Bensayah v. 
Obama was among the first to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a Guan-
tanamo detainee and therefore acts as an outer boundary in determining 
a more concrete standard for determining who is “part of” the Taliban or 
al-Qaeda. In articulating such a standard, this Comment proceeds first by 
analyzing previous case law and examining the four indicia commonly 
used to determine a detainee’s status. In light of this case law, including 
the recent Bensayah decision, this Comment then proposes a balancing 
test to replace the current case-by-case method as a more reliable and 
predictable means of determining whether a detainee is “part of” the Ta-
liban or al-Qaeda. 
Introduction 
 In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, which 
caused the deaths of nearly 3000 innocent civilians, Congress enacted 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).1 This legislation 
gave the President powers to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . .”2 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
2 Id.; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006). Section 2(a) of the AUMF 
states in its entirety: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, au-
thorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent 
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Acting pursuant to the AUMF, President George W. Bush deployed mil-
itary forces in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, capturing many alleged 
insurgents who took up arms in opposition to the United States, and 
detained them indefinitely as “unlawful enemy combatants.”3 Many of 
the alleged enemy combatants detained at the Guantanamo Bay deten-
tion facility in Cuba challenged their detention by petitioning the 
courts for writs of habeas corpus.4 The law addressing the unique cir-
cumstances of a Guantanamo detainee has evolved since the enactment 
of the AUMF in 2001 as the courts have heard more habeas corpus pe-
titions from a varied pool of alleged unlawful enemy combatants.5 In 
2008, the United States District Court for the D.C. Circuit adopted the 
current definition of “enemy combatant” as “an individual who was part 
of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces.”6 The courts have experi-
enced problems determining who is “part of” terrorist organizations 
such as al-Qaeda because these organizations do not “issue member-
                                                                                                                      
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons. 
AUMF § 2(a). 
3 See Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene II ), 553 U.S. 723, 788 (2008), rev’g, 476 F.3d 981 
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 568; Thanassis Cambanis & John Donnelly, Ground 
Troops Push Into Iraq; Missiles Batter Baghdad Again Copter Crash in Kuwait Kills 12 Britons, 4 
US Soldiers, Boston Globe, Mar. 21, 2003, at A1; Colin Nickerson, Taliban Scoff at ‘Second 
Chance’ to Hand Over Bin Laden, Boston Globe, Oct. 14, 2001, at A29. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the definition of “enemy combatant” that controlled prior to the Obama ad-
ministration, as well as a proposal for a more inclusive definition, see Christina D. Elmore, 
Comment, An Enemy Within Our Midst: Distinguishing Combatants from Civilians in the War 
Against Terrorism, 57 U. Kan. L. Rev. 213, 242–43 (2008). 
4 See Boumediene II, 553 U.S. at 723. The writ of habeas corpus acts “to bring a party be-
fore a court.” Black’s Law Dictionary 778 (9th ed. 2009). The initial question in the 
Guantanamo detainee habeas corpus petitions was whether the U.S. Constitution allowed 
those detained outside of the United States to be heard in its courts. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466, 473 (2004). The Supreme Court extended the writ to Guantanamo detainees by 
examining the means by which the United States leased Guantanamo Bay’s military facility 
from Cuba, holding that the agreement extended de facto sovereignty over the land. See id. 
at 480–81, 484. 
5 See Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 720–21, 724–25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (describing 
the procedural history of the habeas petition with regard to Guantanamo detainees and 
the effects of the Obama administration’s new policies). 
6 Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008). The Supreme Court 
set out the full definition of an enemy combatant as follows: 
[A]n individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or 
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent 
act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. 
Id. 
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ship cards or uniforms” and establishing membership outside of an or-
ganized command structure is difficult.7 When President Barack Ob-
ama took office in 2009, the accepted definition became even more 
significant because the Obama administration ended the practice of 
using the President’s constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief 
to justify the detentions.8 Thus, the determining factor for the Guan-
tanamo detainees’ freedom is now whether they are “part of” the Tali-
ban or al-Qaeda forces—a determination made on a case-by-case basis.9 
With the recent decision of Bensayah v. Obama, which was among the 
first cases to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a Guantanamo detainee, it 
is now possible to set an outer boundary for who is considered “part of” 
the Taliban or al-Qaeda.10 
 This Comment critiques the courts’ practice of using a case-by-
case approach to determining whether a detainee is “part of” the Tali-
ban or al-Qaeda. Part I gives an overview of the Guantanamo detention 
process and the application of the writ of habeas corpus to detainees. 
Part II analyzes the current case-by-case method. Part III then examines 
this method in light of the specific facts from important cases in the 
area to extrapolate the indicia upon which courts rely in finding a peti-
                                                                                                                      
7 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.D.C. 2009); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2047, 
2108–17 (2005) (discussing the vagaries of defining who is part of a terrorist “organiza-
tion” and the issue of associated forces). 
8 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 722; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice 
Withdraws “Enemy Combatant” Definition for Guantanamo Detainees (Mar. 13, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.html. The Obama Admini-
stration also ceased all use of the term “enemy combatant,” though it did continue to detain 
individuals who were “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
supra. 
9 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. In ending the practice of using the constitutional au-
thority of the Commander-in-Chief to justify the detentions, the Obama Administration 
also greatly increased the burden of proof required to show that a habeas petitioner “sup-
ported” the Taliban or al-Qaeda, thereby making paramount the determination of whether 
a habeas petitioner is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda. See id. at 722; Press Release, Dep’t 
of Justice, supra note 8. 
10 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725 (relying on the same four indicia discussed in Part III 
of this Comment); see also Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 16–17 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(denying a detainee’s habeas petition because he received a small amount of military 
training at a Taliban training camp); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 418, 425, 427 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying habeas corpus to a petitioner, who allegedly trained at an al-
Qaeda camp to assist the Chechen army against the Russians, in part because he later trav-
eled and associated with those linked to al-Qaeda); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9, 11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (denying habeas corpus to a petitioner with no weapons training or association 
to al-Qaeda because he entered an existing al-Qaeda barricade and battled alongside other 
al-Qaeda fighters); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying 
habeas corpus to an al-Qaeda cook found with a brigade-issued weapon); infra Part III. 
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tioner is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Finally, Part IV proposes a 
categorical balancing test for determining which individuals are “part 
of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda. 
I. Background 
 Congress enacted the AUMF just seven days after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.11 President Bush subsequently deployed 
troops in Afghanistan and Iraq and began the practice of detaining 
captured “enemy combatants” at the military facility in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba.12 In 2002, the Supreme Court addressed the President’s au-
thority to detain enemy combatants and the ability of citizen-
combatants to contest their detentions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.13 Although 
the Court found the detention in Hamdi lawful, it also held that the de-
tainee, who was a U.S. citizen, had a right to constitutional due proc-
ess.14 On the same day that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal for lack of sovereign jurisdiction, the Su-
preme Court in Rasul v. Bush first decided the issue of jurisdiction with 
respect to non-citizen detainees held at Guantanamo.15 The Supreme 
Court reversed, finding jurisdiction and thus laying the foundation for 
future habeas corpus petitions.16 
 In response to these decisions, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) for the pur-
pose of determining if Guantanamo detainees were rightfully held ac-
cording to the definition of the term “enemy combatant” set forth by 
the Department of Defense.17 The government intended these CSRTs 
                                                                                                                      
11 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
12 See Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene II ), 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008), rev’g, 476 F.3d 
981 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Cambanis & Donnelly, supra note 3; Nickerson, supra note 3; Kenneth 
Roth, Op-Ed., Human Rights in the War on Terror, Boston Globe, Sept. 22, 2004, at A15. 
13 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521, 533 (2004). 
14 See id. at 518, 535. The detention of these individuals is not explicitly authorized by 
the AUMF, but the Supreme Court held that detention is “so fundamental and accepted 
an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress 
has authorized the President to use.” Id. at 518. The Court also held, however, that “a citi-
zen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive 
notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Gov-
ernment’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.” Id. at 533. 
15 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472–73 (2004), rev’g, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
16 See id. 
17 See Boumediene II, 553 U.S. at 732–33. The definition set forth by the Department of 
Defense and used during the CSRT proceedings is the same definition adopted on remand 
by the D.C. District Court in a memorandum order. See Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 
2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008); supra note 6. 
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to be an adequate substitution for constitutional due process, but chal-
lenges to their efficacy caused a split within the United States District 
Court for the D.C. Circuit.18 Before the matter could reach the Su-
preme Court, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(DTA) with the intent of stripping the courts of jurisdiction over ha-
beas corpus petitions.19 The Supreme Court, however, held in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld that the DTA was inapplicable to cases pending when the 
DTA was enacted.20 Therefore, in an attempt to correct the apparent 
statutory deficiencies with respect to stripping the courts’ jurisdiction 
to hear habeas petitions from non-citizens detained at Guantanamo, 
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).21 
 In Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene II ), the Supreme Court held 
that the MCA did indeed strip courts of their jurisdiction over habeas 
corpus petitions, but that it did so unconstitutionally.22 On remand, the 
district court denied to petitioner Belkacem Bensayah a writ of habeas 
corpus because of his alleged connections to a senior al-Qaeda facilita-
tor and his likely support of al-Qaeda (Boumediene III ).23 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Boumediene II, 553 U.S. at 732–33; In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 
2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Boumediene II, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that 
the CSRT process violated the due process rights of non-resident aliens detained at Guan-
tanamo Bay); Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Boume-
diene II, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that constitutional due process was not guaranteed 
for non-resident aliens detained outside of the sovereign United States in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba). 
19 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2741, 
2742–43 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010)); see Boum-
ediene II, 553 U.S. at 732. 
20 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575–76 (2006). 
21 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
22 See Boumediene II, 553 U.S. at 792. The Supreme Court in Boumediene II held that Article 
I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution reaches to Guantanamo Bay and, if jurisdiction is to 
be stripped, Congress must meet the requirements of the Suspension Clause—something it 
did not do with the MCA. See id. at 771. Therefore, the Court allowed the detainees to be 
heard on their habeas petitions and, on remand, the district court ordered the release of five 
of the six petitioners. See id. at 773; Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene III ), 579 F. Supp. 2d 
191, 198–99 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
23 See Boumediene III, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 198. Bensayah was one of the six petitioners in 
Boumediene II. See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 720–21. Bensayah is an Algerian citizen who trav-
eled to Bosnia using a falsified passport, allegedly in order to escape persecution. Id. at 
727. He and five other Algerian men were arrested in Bosnia for an alleged attempt to 
attack the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. Id. at 720. When Bosnian authorities failed to uncover 
any evidence of the plot, the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ordered that Bensayah and the five other prisoners be released. Id. They were then turned 
over to U.S. forces and brought to Guantanamo Bay as suspected terrorists. Id. Although 
the other five petitioners from Boumediene II were granted habeas on remand by the court 
in Boumediene III, the government elected to present extra evidence against Bensayah dur-
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 In 2009, President Barack Obama took office and changed the 
manner in which the government handles habeas corpus petitions.24 
The Department of Justice began relying solely on the AUMF to provide 
authorization for detaining individuals at Guantanamo Bay, eschewing 
the use of the term enemy combatant, and ending the detentions of 
those who insubstantially support the Taliban or al-Qaeda.25 These pol-
icy changes impacted Bensayah because the district court in Boumediene 
III rejected his petition for a writ of habeas corpus due only to his al-
leged “‘support’ [of al-Qaeda] within the meaning of the ‘enemy com-
batant’ definition governing [the] case.”26 Consequently, the Depart-
ment of Justice changed its stance and began arguing for Bensayah’s 
continued detention because he was “part of” al-Qaeda.27 Bensayah 
once again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was 
not “part of” al-Qaeda, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found in-
sufficient evidence on record to hold the petitioner to have been “part 
of” the organization.28 
II. The Case-by-Case Methodology 
 Under the Bush administration, the Department of Justice was 
able to use the AUMF in conjunction with the President’s inherent 
constitutional authority to detain any individual who could have pro-
                                                                                                                      
ing the classified proceedings. See Boumediene III, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 193, 199. The evidence 
was an alleged link to a senior al-Qaeda official, documents establishing a history of travel 
using false passports, and information tending to undermine Bensayah’s credibility. See 
Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 722. Since the decision in Boumediene III, a number of other detainees 
have filed habeas corpus petitions. See Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 16–17 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (denying a detainee’s habeas petition because he received a small amount of 
military training at a Taliban training camp); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 418, 425, 
427 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying habeas corpus to a petitioner, who allegedly trained at an al-
Qaeda camp to assist the Chechen army against the Russians, in part because he later trav-
eled and associated with those linked to al-Qaeda); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9, 11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (denying habeas corpus to a petitioner with no weapons training or association 
to al-Qaeda because he entered an existing al-Qaeda barricade and battled alongside other 
al-Qaeda fighters); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying 
habeas corpus to an al-Qaeda cook found with a brigade-issued weapon); infra Part III. 
24 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8; Amanda Rugerri, President Obama’s First 
Day: Reversing Key Bush Policies on Detainees, Information Access, U.S. News & World Report 
( Jan. 22, 2009), http://politics.usnews.com/news/obama/articles/2009/01/22/president- 
obamas-first-day-reversing-key-bush-policies-on-detainees-information-access.html. 
25 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8. 
26 See Boumediene III, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 198; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8. 
27 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 722. 
28 See id. at 720, 727. 
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vided minimal support to al-Qaeda.29 The analysis regarding who may 
be considered “part of” al-Qaeda has remained stagnant since Boumedi-
ene II, with courts continuing to employ a case-by-case method using a 
“functional rather than formal approach” to determine a detainee’s 
relationship to al-Qaeda.30 Under this functional approach, a court 
looks not only to an individual’s involvement in al-Qaeda’s “command 
structure,” but also to other unnamed indicia that may be present in 
the facts of a particular case.31 
 The case-by-case methodology used to determine whether a de-
tainee is “part of” al-Qaeda indicates that the courts are not concerned 
with the possibility of providing insufficient legal protection to these 
individuals.32 The Supreme Court often uses broad, overprotective, 
bright-line rules when the enforcement of an individual’s constitutional 
rights is paramount.33 A case-by-case method of analysis does not pro-
vide enough protection to individuals because of the subjectivity of 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 1165, 1209–10, 1209 
n.194  (“[T]he government applied a much broader definition of enemy combatants 
[through the CSRTs] than the Supreme Court approved in Hamdi.”); Press Release, Dep’t 
of Justice, supra note 8. 
30 See Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Hamlily v. Ob-
ama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the court’s approach is “more 
functional than formal, as there are no settled criteria for determining who is a ‘part of’ an 
organization such as al Qaeda”); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 n.7 (D.D.C. 
2009) (employing a case-by-case analysis). One of the difficulties with the case-by-case 
analysis is that “it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for determining 
whether an individual is ‘part of’ al Qaeda.” Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. 
31 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. As the D.C. Circuit has declared, the fact that “an indi-
vidual operates within al Qaeda’s formal command structure is surely sufficient” for the 
government to hold that person under the AUMF. Id. In less clear cases, though, alleged 
enemy combatants may still be “part of” al-Qaeda without falling within its command struc-
ture; and it is in this grey area that courts conduct the case-by-case analysis. See Awad v. 
Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (using a case-by-case, fact-intensive approach to 
deny habeas corpus to the petitioner). 
32 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725; cf. Donald Koblitz, Note, “The Public Has a Claim to 
Every Man’s Evidence”: The Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 Stan L. 
Rev. 1211, 1239 n.127 (1978) (stating that a case-by-case analysis does not properly protect 
a defendant’s right to evidence); Sarah E. Snyder, Note, Experimental or Demonstrable: Has 
DNA Testing Truly Emerged from the Twilight Zone? An Assessment of Washington’s Response to 
DNA Identification, 31 Willamette L. Rev. 201, 202 (1995) (stating that case-by-case analy-
ses fail to protect criminal defendants from the introduction of improper evidence); Alea-
tra P. Williams, Insurers’ Rights of Subrogation Against Tenants: The Begotten Union Between Eq-
uity and Her Beloved, 55 Drake L. Rev. 541, 564 (2007) (discussing how case-by-case 
analyses lack certainty and hamper a litigant’s ability to adequately protect himself or her-
self). 
33 Cf. David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1333, 1349 (2005) (not-
ing the “inadequacy of case-by-case adjudication to protect constitutional rights”). 
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judges, the inherent difficulty in making subtle distinctions, and the 
vagueness of the current standard.34 
 Whatever the underlying reason, the case-by-case approach cre-
ates far too much uncertainty in this critical area of law by leading to 
different conclusions on identical issues.35 A case-by-case analysis is also 
generally not ideal because of the difficulty inherent in making subtle 
distinctions between similar cases.36 Furthermore, within an individual 
petitioner’s set of circumstances, a number of factors could sway the 
court depending on the amount of weight given to each piece of evi-
                                                                                                                      
34 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (discussing distinctions of “minimal if not ephem-
eral character” and lamenting the implementation of the vague term “support” within the 
AUMF); cf. William B. Fisch & Robert S. Kay, The Constitutionalization of Law in the United 
States, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Sup. 437, 449 (1998) (stating that, in the context of criminal 
procedure, the subtle distinctions required in case-by-case analyses lead to many appeals 
and Supreme Court cases); Gans, supra note 33, at 1349–50 (discussing the problems in-
herent in a case-by-case approach to examining confessions for voluntariness). Compare 
Naji Al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 44–45 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that a detainee 
may be held despite no longer posing a threat to the United States), with Al Ginco v. 
Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129–30 (D.D.C. 2009) (granting habeas corpus to a peti-
tioner because he no longer posed a threat to the United States). One well-known exam-
ple of the issue of vagueness is the Supreme Court case of Jacobellis v. Ohio, where Justice 
Stewart famously tackled the issue of hard-core pornography: 
[U]nder the First and Fourteenth Amendments[,] criminal laws in this area 
are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography. I shall not today at-
tempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced 
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in in-
telligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture in-
volved in this case is not that. 
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
35 See Naji Al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 44–45; Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 129–30. For 
example, on the question of whether, after some passage of time or intervening events, a 
detainee who was once “part of” al-Qaeda can be considered sufficiently estranged from 
the organization and thus granted habeas relief, Judge Leon of the district court re-
sponded in the affirmative. See Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 129. The petitioner in Al Ginco 
v. Obama had traveled to Afghanistan to take up arms against the Northern Alliance and 
trained with the Taliban for a number of days before they accused him of being a spy for 
Coalition forces. See id. at 127. The Taliban officials then tortured him, made him admit 
that he was a U.S. spy, and imprisoned him for eighteen months. See id. Although Judge 
Leon found that he was once “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the Taliban’s torture and 
imprisonment of the petitioner effectively demonstrated that he was no longer a “part of” 
either of these organizations. See id. at 129. This opinion, however, directly conflicted with 
that of Judge Leon’s fellow district court judge Royce C. Lamberth in Naji Al Warafi v. Ob-
ama, which explicitly stated that “one factor the Court will not consider is whether peti-
tioner presently poses a threat to the national security of the United States.” See 704 F. 
Supp. 2d at 38. 
36 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 71; cf. Fisch & Kay, supra note 34, at 448–49 (discussing 
the pitfalls of a case-by case methodology, including “increas[ed] uncertainty” and height-
ened need for intervention from appellate courts). 
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dence.37 The case-by-case approach also allows for differing findings in 
strikingly similar situations when the standard being applied is too va-
gue.38 Despite the shortcomings of a case-by-case method, courts con-
tinue to state that there are no established criteria for determining who 
is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda.39 
III. The Four Indicia 
 In order to propose a potential standard for determining 
whether a petitioner is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the basic facts 
from each of the cases decided between Boumediene II and the present 
must be analyzed.40 Looking at the facts of each case, it is apparent that 
there are only four established indicia that a petitioner is “part of” the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda: (1) the individual received weapons training from 
the Taliban or al-Qaeda; (2) the individual possessed weapons during 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43. For example, the petitioner in Naji al 
Warafi served primarily as a medic for Taliban forces fighting on the front lines. See id. at 
42. The court, in holding that he was “part of” the Taliban, made a distinction between 
acting as a medic within the command structure of the military organization and acting as 
a medic on his own volition. See id. at 42–43. Such minute distinctions will cause confusion 
among courts attempting to follow precedent through application of a case-by-case me-
thod of analysis. See id.; Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 71. 
38 See David Costa Levenson, Proposal for Reform of Choice of Avoidance Law in the Context 
of International Bankruptcies from a U.S. Perspective, 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 291, 310 
(2002) (criticizing a case-by-case method of analysis as “being unpredictable, vague and 
open-ended”); see also Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 70–71 (noting that the court will adhere 
to its interpretation of the government’s revised standard for detention on a case-by-case 
basis); Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Note, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interests of the Child 
Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. Third World L. J. 131, 144–45 (2006) 
(noting that one vague standard may be applied in many different ways depending on the 
judge who hears the case and the court where that judge is sitting). 
39 See Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 37–38. It is sufficient but not necessary for a per-
son to be within the command structure of the Taliban or al-Qaeda because there are other 
ways of showing that an individual is “part of” these organizations. See Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. 
40 See generally Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (granting habeas cor-
pus to a petitioner accused of facilitating travel for Taliban or al-Qaeda members because 
of the absence of direct evidence linking him to those organizations); Barhoumi v. Obama, 
609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding petitioner to be “part of” al-Qaeda because he 
trained with organizations and traveled with individuals associated with al-Qaeda); Naji al 
Warafi v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding the petitioner to be “part of” 
the Taliban because, though he was a medic, he also received weapons training from the 
Taliban at the front lines); Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene III ), 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (granting 
habeas corpus to five petitioners because they did not support and were not “part of” the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda). Whereas the government no longer relies on the “support” justifica-
tion, proving Guantanamo detainees are “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda has become the 
crux of the Department of Justice’s attempts to continue holding them. See Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8. 
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the relevant period of time; (3) the individual traveled or associated 
with members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda; or (4) the individual was in-
tentionally present alongside members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda in 
battle or at the front lines.41 
A. Weapons Training 
 The receipt of weapons training from military camps operated 
by the Taliban, al-Qaeda, or their affiliates weighs heavily in courts’ de-
terminations that individuals are “part of” such organizations.42 For ex-
ample, in Al Odah v. United States, the court made special note that the 
petitioner had attended a Taliban-run military training camp for a sin-
gle day to practice target shooting with a Kalashnikov AK-47 machine 
gun.43 The court disregarded the petitioner’s defense that he was mere-
ly following the orders of a civilian official in a foreign country.44 Other 
courts have also followed the maxim that military training in any capac-
ity is indicative of being “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda.45 To date, all 
                                                                                                                      
41 See Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 16–17 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying a de-
tainee’s habeas petition because he received military training at a Taliban training camp); 
Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 418, 425, 427 (denying habeas corpus to a petitioner in part because 
he traveled and associated with those linked to al-Qaeda); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9, 11 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying habeas corpus to a petitioner solely because he entered an exist-
ing al-Qaeda barricade and battled alongside other al-Qaeda fighters); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 
590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying habeas corpus to an al-Qaeda cook found 
with a brigade-issued weapon); supra Part II. With the recent decision in Bensayah supply-
ing an outer boundary for this standard, at least one of the four indicia must be present to 
find a petitioner is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda under the AUMF. See 610 F.3d at 727 
(granting habeas corpus to the petitioner when none of the four indicia were found); see 
also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (finding that the AUMF grants the Pres-
ident the power to detain “individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants”). 
42 See Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 10; Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 418; Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
at 36; Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2010). The case law in this area indi-
cates that courts are willing to consider even a small amount of military training as suffi-
cient to deny a habeas corpus petition. See Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 16–17. 
43 Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 10. 
44 See id. at 15–16. 
45 See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 427; Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 42, 44; Anam, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d at 12–13, 16. In Naji al Warafi, the court found it irrelevant that a petitioner, who 
was a medic for Taliban forces on the front line, trained on an AK-47 but did not engage in 
any active combat. See 704 F. Supp. 2d at 36. Although the courts have said that a cleric or 
doctor who gives support to Taliban or al-Qaeda fighters will not be considered “part of” 
those organizations, this doctrine is limited to those who act in no other capacity. See id. at 44; 
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009). Those who act both as a medic or 
cleric and as a fighter will be subject to detention under the AUMF. See Naji al Warafi, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d at 41–42. Thus, despite minimal contact with weapons, the court in Naji al Warafi 
still weighed the medic’s weapons training heavily in its consideration, ultimately finding the 
petitioner was “part of” the Taliban. See id. at 42, 44. 
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petitioners with weapons training have been denied writs of habeas 
corpus.46 
B. Weapons Possession 
 In addition to weapons training, the courts have placed particu-
lar emphasis on the fact of a petitioner’s carrying weapons during the 
time he was allegedly “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda.47 For example, 
the petitioner in Al-Bihani v. Obama was a cook for Taliban-associated 
forces on the front lines.48 The Court implied that merely acting as 
support for the troops might not have been enough to warrant contin-
ued detention under the AUMF, but the fact that the petitioner was 
found with a brigade-issued weapon when he was captured furthered 
the inference that he was in fact “part of” that brigade and, by associa-
tion, the Taliban.49 A court may also find that the mere possession of a 
weapon, in the presence of other indicia, indicates that a petitioner is 
“part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda.50 
                                                                                                                      
46 See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 418; Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 42, 44; Anam, 696 F. 
Supp. 2d at 12. The one factor that may operate to negate this general rule is temporal 
disassociation. See Naji Al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 38; Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 
123, 129 (D.D.C. 2009); supra note 35. If an individual was once “part of” the Taliban or al-
Qaeda, his detention may no longer be necessary if subsequent events and the passage of 
time clearly demonstrate his dissociation from the group. See Naji Al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 
2d at 38; Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 129; supra note 35. 
47 See Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 11; Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869. 
48 Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869. 
49 See id. at 872–73. Courts are reluctant to use the term “support” to describe the peti-
tioner’s job with the military brigade. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 8. This 
reluctance is rooted in the difficulty proving cases using the Obama administration’s “sub-
stantial support” terminology and is largely why so many cases have instead focused on 
whether a petitioner is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda. See id. See generally Bensayah, 610 
F.3d 718 (granting petitioner habeas corpus after finding that he was not “part of” the 
Taliban or al-Qaeda despite the government’s earlier justification that he supported those 
organizations); Barhoumi, 609 F.3d 416 (finding petitioner to be “part of” al-Qaeda); Naji al 
Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32 (finding petitioner to be “part of” the Taliban). 
50 See Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 10–11. In Al Odah, the petitioner was given a Kalashnikov 
AK-47 machine gun and told to travel through the White Mountains in the Tora Bora re-
gion with a large group of men. See id. at 11. Some of the men were armed while they were 
attacked by U.S. warplanes, and this implicated at least two of the other indicia—travel or 
association with members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda and intentional presence alongside 
members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda in battle or at the front lines. See id.; see also Barhoumi, 
609 F.3d at 418, 425, 427 (denying habeas corpus to a petitioner in part because he trav-
eled and associated with those linked to al-Qaeda); Awad, 608 F.3d at 9, 11 (denying ha-
beas corpus to a petitioner solely because he entered an existing al-Qaeda barricade and 
battled alongside other al-Qaeda fighters); infra Part III.C & D. Despite these potentially 
more substantial connections to the Taliban, the court placed heavy emphasis on the fact 
that the petitioner himself was armed during this time. See Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 15–16. 
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C. Travel or Association with Members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda 
 Another main indication that an individual is “part of” the Tali-
ban or al-Qaeda is his travel with other members of those organizations.51 
A number of cases since Boumediene II have regarded as incriminating a 
detainee’s travel and association with members of the Taliban or al-
Qaeda; all of these cases coupled this associational inquiry with analysis 
of the other three indicia described in this Comment.52 The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals has made it clear, though, that not every individual who 
associates with a member of a terrorist organization may be included, 
ipso facto, among that organization’s members.53 This distinction shows 
that travel or association is important in determining whether an indi-
vidual is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda but should not be given as 
much weight as the other three indicia.54 
 Despite understanding that association with members of a 
group does not equate to membership in that group, courts have not 
granted habeas petitions for individuals who acted both within and out-
side the protected sphere carved out of the travel and association doc-
trine.55 For example, the petitioner in Naji al Warafi v. Obama assisted 
the Taliban as a medic—one of the protected associational activities 
that does not automatically prove group membership.56 The court nev-
ertheless denied the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus because he also 
received weapons training and carried a weapon—conduct outside the 
sphere of activities excepted from the travel and association doctrine.57 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 11. 
52 See id. at 10–11; Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 418–19; Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869; Naji al Wa-
rafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 37; Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 12–14; supra Part III.A & B; infra Part 
III.D. Therefore, the limits are not clear as to what extent mere travel or association with 
members of a terrorist organization would implicate one as “part of” that group. See Ghere-
bi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 68. 
53 See Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 68. The court in Gherebi v. Obama carved out a pro-
tected sphere from the travel and association doctrine by stating that an individual “tasked 
with housing, feeding, or transporting al-Qaeda fighters could be detained . . . notwith-
standing his lack of involvement in the actual fighting itself, but an al-Qaeda doctor or 
cleric, or the father of an al-Qaeda fighter who shelters his son out of familial loyalty, could 
not be detained . . . .” Id. at 69. 
54 See id.; supra Part III.A & B; infra Part III.D. 
55 See Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 41. 
56 See id. at 40–41; Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
57 See Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 43, 45; see also Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 16–17 (deny-
ing a detainee’s habeas petition because he received a small amount of military training at 
a Taliban training camp); Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872–73 (denying habeas corpus to an al-
Qaeda cook found with a brigade-issued weapon); supra Part III.A & B. When the peti-
tioner’s Taliban brigade negotiated a surrender guaranteeing safe passage for the fighters, 
he was commanded to travel alongside other Taliban members and was later intercepted 
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 Courts have also used travel or association with Taliban or al-
Qaeda members as a means of justifying detention when the other indi-
cia provide less support.58 For example, the petitioner in Barhoumi v. 
Obama claimed to have traveled to Afghanistan to receive weapons train-
ing with the express purpose of helping the Chechens fight against the 
Russians.59 The court indicated that additional evidence, aside from the 
petitioner’s receipt of training at a camp associated with al-Qaeda, was 
necessary to show he was “part of” that organization.60 The petitioner’s 
capture by Pakistani police officers in a guesthouse alongside Zubaydah, 
a known training camp leader who had ties to al-Qaeda, however, was 
sufficient to implicate him as “part of” al-Qaeda.61 The court thus used 
the petitioner’s subsequent travel and association activities to strengthen 
its rationale for denying the petition for habeas corpus.62 
                                                                                                                      
and captured by the Northern Alliance. See Naji al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 43. It is un-
clear, however, if the court would have granted a writ of habeas corpus in the absence of 
weapons training or weapon possession and merely because he traveled under orders with 
other Taliban members as a medic. See id. at 44 (listing a number of factors that indicate 
petitioner was “part of” the Taliban). 
58 See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 424–25 (relying in part upon the petitioner’s travel and as-
sociation with known al-Qaeda associates to find him to be “part of” that organization). 
59 Id. at 418. 
60 See id. at 425, 427. Normally, such training would be sufficient to find a petitioner 
was “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda but, because the camp in which the Barhoumi peti-
tioner received training was not directly affiliated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, it is at least 
plausible he really did intend to assist the Chechens against the Russians, which would put 
him outside the purview of the President’s power to detain under the AUMF. See AUMF, 
Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)); 
Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 418, 425; supra Part III.A. 
61 See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 419, 427. The court directly rejected the petitioner’s guilt-
by-association defense, holding that his association with Zubaydah after completing his 
training was enough to show he had an active role within an organization associated with 
al-Qaeda. See id. at 424, 427. 
62 See id. at 427, 432. The United States District Court for the D.C. Circuit also applied 
this reasoning in Anam v. Obama, where the petitioner trained at an al-Qaeda facility and 
subsequently lived in an apartment for a year in close proximity to al-Qaeda members. See 
696 F. Supp. 2d at 12–13. The petitioner met with Usama bin Laden and lived in close 
proximity to other high-level al-Qaeda officials. See id. at 13. The court rejected the peti-
tioner’s defense that his life would be in danger if he ceased his association with the al-
Qaeda members because, at one point in his trip, he attempted to leave for Yemen and was 
only thwarted because the Iranian border patrol turned him around. See id. at 14. Al-
though some courts will accept a petitioner’s defense that he no longer wishes to be part 
of al-Qaeda, the court in Anam found the petitioner’s ample opportunity to leave his com-
rades dispositive of the issue. See id. at 15–16; Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 129. 
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D. Intentional Presence Alongside Members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda in  
Battle or at the Front Lines 
 Of the four indicia, courts find most compelling a petitioner’s 
intentional presence alongside members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda in 
battle or at the front lines.63 Indeed, because intentional presence in bat-
tle or at the front lines is so highly indicative of an individual being “part 
of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda, such presence lessens the importance of the 
other three indicia.64 This principle is supported by the holding in Awad 
v. Obama, a case in which, despite the lack of evidence that the petitioner 
received weapons training or had previous association with al-Qaeda, the 
court found he was part of the organization because he entered an exist-
ing al-Qaeda barricade and battled alongside other al-Qaeda fighters.65 
The petitioner’s intentional presence alongside al-Qaeda fighters in bat-
tle was sufficient to convince the court that a writ of habeas corpus would 
be inappropriate.66 
IV. The Balancing Test 
 From these four indicia, which are common to all petitions for 
habeas corpus from Guantanamo detainees, it is possible to develop a 
test to avoid the deficiencies of a case-by-case analysis.67 The threshold 
determination a court must make before applying this test is whether 
the petitioner was part of a formal command structure.68 If a detainee 
                                                                                                                      
63 See Awad, 608 F.3d at 9; Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 14. 
64 See Awad, 608 F.3d at 9 (discussing how the petitioner’s intent to fight against the 
United States and allied forces and his effectuation of that intent made him “part of” al-
Qaeda); Anam, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (noting that the “most inflammatory” piece of evi-
dence against the petitioner was his intentional engagement in a two-and-a-half-hour fire-
fight against Pakistani authorities alongside individuals associated with al-Qaeda); supra 
Part III.A–C. As discussed in Part III.C, intentional presence at the front lines or during 
battle may be excusable if the petitioner was acting only as a cleric or medic. See Gherebi, 
609 F. Supp. 2d at 69; supra note 53. 
65 See Awad, 608 F.3d at 7–9, 11. During the period of the two-month siege on the al-
Qaeda fighters’ barricaded wing of the hospital, the other al-Qaeda fighters surrendered 
the petitioner because he was in desperate need of medical treatment after having his 
right leg amputated. See id. at 4–5. 
66 See id. at 11–12. A finding that an individual is a “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda al-
so applies to those who were intentionally present at the front lines even if they were not 
engaged in battle. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 869, 873–74. 
67 See Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 16–17 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Barhoumi v. Ob-
ama, 609 F.3d 416, 418, 425, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 9, 11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Fisch & Kay, supra 
note 34, at 448–49; Gans, supra note 33, at 1350; Williams, supra note 32, at 564; supra Parts 
II & III. 
68 See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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is found to be within the command structure of the Taliban or al-
Qaeda, then the analysis ends and the petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus must be denied.69 
 If the petitioner is not within the command structure, however, 
then a court should analyze the four indicia—weapons training, weap-
ons possession, travel or association with members of the Taliban or al-
Qaeda, and intentional presence alongside members of the Taliban or 
al-Qaeda in battle or at the front lines—to determine who is “part of” 
the Taliban or al-Qaeda.70 Because not all the indicia may be present in 
each petitioner’s case, a balancing test is the appropriate mechanism to 
determine if a petitioner is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda.71 The 
presence or absence of each indicium would allow a court to make a 
tailored factual determination without succumbing to some of the 
problems inherent in a case-by-case analysis.72 
 In this balancing test, Bensayah acts as an outer boundary for 
determining who is “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda because the court 
ordered the petitioner’s release without delving into the issue of tem-
poral disassociation from the Taliban or al-Qaeda.73 Although the deci-
sion in Al Ginco v. Obama is significant because the court granted the 
petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, it did so on temporal disassociation 
grounds.74 Bensayah, in contrast, was the first in this line of cases to 
grant a habeas petition after scrutinizing the activities that led to the 
                                                                                                                      
69 See id. 
70 See Awad, 608 F.3d at 9; Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Bar-
houmi, 609 F.3d at 418,417; Naji al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2010); 
Boumediene v. Bush (Boumediene III ), 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d sub 
nom. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010); supra Part III. 
71 See, e.g., Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (finding evidence of intentional presence alongside al-
Qaeda members in battle sufficient to implicate the petitioner as “part of” al-Qaeda). 
72 See supra Part II; cf. Fisch & Kay, supra note 34, at 448–49 (discussing the problems 
created by a case-by-case approach to adjudicating claims of infringement of suspects’ 
rights); Gans, supra note 33, at 1349–50 (discussing the problems inherent in a case-by-case 
approach to examining confessions for voluntariness); Williams, supra note 32, at 564 (dis-
cussing how case-by-case methods of analysis lack certainty and hamper litigants’ ability to 
protect themselves adequately). There is, however, still uncertainty in the temporal nature 
of being “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda that cannot be cured by implementing a balanc-
ing test. See Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2009). 
73 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 727; see also Naji Al Warafi, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 44–45 (allow-
ing for continued detention despite the court’s determination that the petitioner no long-
er poses a threat to the United States); Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 129–30 (granting ha-
beas corpus to a petitioner who, though once “part of” the Taliban, was deemed no longer 
a threat due to subsequent torture and imprisonment). 
74 See Al Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 129–30. 
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petitioner’s detention.75 Because the court in Bensayah granted the peti-
tioner’s writ of habeas corpus in the absence of each of the four indicia, 
thereby indicating their importance in determining that a detainee is 
“part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the case allows for the implementa-
tion of a balancing test and acts as an outer boundary in that test.76 
More importantly, if such a balancing test were applied to Bensayah as 
well as previous cases, it would tend toward the same outcomes while 
allowing courts to draw on a body of case law and engage in a more 
principled mode of analysis than the case-by-case method.77 
Conclusion 
 The practice of using a case-by-case approach to determining 
whether detainees are “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda is no longer 
necessary because there is sufficient case law from which to derive a 
balancing test. The reasoning employed in all cases after Boumediene II 
establishes four indicia as to whether a detainee rightfully may be con-
sidered “part of” the Taliban or al-Qaeda—weapons training, weapons 
possession, travel or association with members of the Taliban or al-
Qaeda, and intentional presence alongside members of the Taliban or 
al-Qaeda in battle or at the front lines. In the balancing test, the court 
would first assess whether the petitioner acted within the command 
structure of the organization and, if so, deny the petition for habeas 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 727. The facts of Bensayah establish that the petitioner en-
tered Bosnia from his home in Algeria using a falsified passport to escape persecution. Id. 
at 720, 727. He was tried before the Bosnian courts for the alleged bombing of a U.S. em-
bassy in Sarajevo and was ordered released. Boumediene III, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 193–94. De-
spite the order for release, the petitioner was turned over to Bosnian and U.S. authorities 
and sent to Guantanamo Bay for detention. Id. In response to the petitioner’s ultimate 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the government could not prove the petitioner was 
within the command structure of the Taliban or al-Qaeda or that he traveled or associated 
with members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 718. Nor did the govern-
ment contend that he received any sort of military training, carried a weapon, or had any 
intentional presence in battle or at the front lines. Id. at 721 (noting the government 
based its case that petitioner was “part of” al-Qaeda on classified documents, which alleg-
edly implicated the petitioner as a travel facilitator for al-Qaeda). 
76 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 727; supra Part III. Applying the balancing test to the facts 
of Bensayah, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus would be granted—the same outcome 
reached using the case-by-case analysis. See 610 F.3d at 727. 
77 See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 727; see, e.g., Al Odah, 611 F.3d at 16–17 (denying a de-
tainee’s habeas petition in part because he received a small amount of military training at 
a Taliban training camp); Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 427 (determining the petitioner to be 
“part of” al-Qaeda because he trained and then traveled with individuals linked to al-
Qaeda); Awad, 608 F.3d at 11 (finding evidence of intentional presence alongside al-Qaeda 
members in battle sufficient to implicate the petitioner as “part of” al-Qaeda). 
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corpus. If the petitioner did not act within the command structure of 
the organization, then the court would analyze and balance the four 
indicia to establish whether a writ of habeas corpus is warranted. Ben-
sayah would act as the outer boundary of the test such that the absence 
of all four indicia would demonstrate the propriety of habeas relief. 
Such a balancing test is a far more principled mechanism for determin-
ing whether an individual may be detained as “part of” the Taliban or 
al-Qaeda under the AUMF, and it would allow for greater consistency 
and expediency in deciding these very difficult cases. 
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